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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Todd Hill filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After the district court
gave notice of its intent to dismiss the petition for being untimely filed, Mr. Hill asserted
that equitable tolling applied to his petition, because he was denied his constitutional
right of access to the courts. The district court nonetheless dismissed the petition with
prejudice on the ground that the action was untimely, after determining that the doctrine
of equitable tolling did not apply to Mr. Hill's petition.
Mr. Hill appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it dismissed his
petition, because he was denied his right of access to the courts and equitable tolling
therefore applies.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Hill's claimed basis for
equitable tolling based on the adequacy of the prison law library is not preserved for
appeal, or, alternatively, that the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Hill was not
entitled to equitable tolling. (Resp. Br., pp.11-23.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments. The question of
whether the prison law library is inadequate is preserved for appeal. Mr. Hill's right of
access to the courts was denied because the State failed to furnish an adequate law
library or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, and Mr. Hill suffered an
actual injury as a result of those deficiencies. Thus, equitable tolling applies to Mr. Hill's
post-conviction petition, and the district court erred when it dismissed with prejudice
the petition.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Hill's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE

Did the district court err when it dismissed, with prejudice, Mr. Hill's petition for postconviction relief, because Mr. Hill was denied his right of access to the courts and
equitable tolling therefore applies?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed, With Prejudice, Mr. Hill's Petition For PostConviction Relief, Because Mr. Hill Was Denied His Right Of Access To The Courts And
Equitable Tolling Therefore Applies

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hill asserts that the statute of limitations on his petition for post-conviction

relief should be equitably tolled because he was denied his right of access to the courts.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of access to the courts
requires the State to confer the "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts," through providing inmates
with either "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). If
an inmate's right of access to the courts was denied, equitable tolling applies to the
statute of limitations in the inmate's post-conviction proceeding. See State v. Ochieng,
147 Idaho 621, 626 (Ct. App. 2009). In this case, the prison law library did not provide
inmates with access to case law. The prison "paralegals" were prohibited from giving

any legal advice to inmates. Thus, the State did not furnish adequate law libraries or
adequate legal assistance, and Mr. Hill was denied his constitutional right of access to
the courts.

Because Mr. Hill was denied his right of access to the courts, equitable

tolling applies to his post-conviction petition. The district court therefore erred when it
dismissed with prejudice Mr. Hill's post-conviction petition.

8.

Standard Of Review
As a matter of clarification, the district court dismissed Mr. Hill's post-conviction

petition after an evidentiary hearing.

(R., pp.259-60, 266-77.)
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"When reviewing a

decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court
will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."
Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862 (Ct. App. 2010). The appellate court "exercises

free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts." Id.

C.

The Question Of Whether The Prison Law Library Is Inadequate Is Preserved
For Appeal
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Hill asserts that the question of whether the prison

law library is inadequate is preserved for appeal. The State argues this Court should
not consider whether the prison law library is inadequate, because Mr. Hill did not raise
that issue before the district court. (Resp. Br., pp.13-15.) While the State's point that
"issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be addressed" is well taken, see
Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 655 (Ct. App. 2008), Mr. Hill actually raised the

adequacy of the law library before the district court as an aspect of his equitable
tolling issue.
Mr. Hill's equitable tolling issue raised the adequacy of the law library.

In

Mr. Hill's reply to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss the post-conviction
petition, he stated that "it is clear that the Petitioner has presented claims which would
call for equitable tolling of a period of time in excess of 100 days, and therefore the
Petition for Post Conviction Relief is timely filed and should be heard by this Court." In
support of that statement, he asserted that, for "approximately 70 to 110 days, the
Petitioner could not file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief because there [were] no
legal reference materials available to him." (R., p.191.)
Further, Mr. Hill asserted that,
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It is the position of the Petitioner that during the 70 to approximately 110
days that he was denied access to his own legal documents, and denied
access to the laws of the State of Idaho, and denied access to ANY case
precedent, that he is also entitled to equitable tolling during this period
of time.
(R., p.192.) Mr. Hill then cited Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530 (Ct. App. 1997), for the
proposition that "the time period during which an inmate does not have available to him
the necessary legal reference materials from the State of Idaho, which are necessary to
file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief[,] is to be tolled during this time period."
(R., p.192.) In Martinez, the Idaho Court of Appeals held "that Art. I,§ 18 of the Idaho
Constitution imposes the same requirement for provision of adequate prison law
libraries or adequate legal assistance that the United States Supreme Court articulated
in Bounds as a requirement of the Due Process Clause." Martinez, 130 Idaho at 536.
Because Mr. Hill highlighted the lack of access to legal reference materials and the
denial of access to Idaho state laws and any case precedent as grounds for equitable
tolling, he raised the question of whether the prison law library was inadequate.
Because Mr. Hill actually raised the adequacy of the law library before the district
court, this case is distinguishable from Weller. In Weller, the petitioner "did not respond
to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss with evidence or argument as to why his
petition should not be dismissed as untimely. He did not assert to the district court that
the statute of limitation should be tolled for any reason."

Weller, 146 Idaho at 655.

Because an appellate court would not address issues raised for the first time on appeal,
and because an appellate court is not the place for factual assertions, the Idaho Court
of Appeals held that, "to the extent that [the petitioner] attempts to argue on appeal a
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basis to toll the statute of limitation, we will not consider it because that issue is raised
for the first time on appeal." Id.
Unlike the petitioner in Weller, Mr. Hill responded to the district court's notice of
intent to dismiss with evidence and argument as to why his petition should not be
dismissed as untimely. (R., pp.189-193.) Additionally, in contrast to the petitioner in
Weller, Mr. Hill asserted to the district court that the statute of limitations should be

tolled on the basis of equitable tolling.
distinguishable from Weller.

(R., pp.191-92.)

This case is therefore

Mr. Hill actually raised the adequacy of the law library

before the district court as an aspect of his equitable tolling issue. Thus, the question of
whether the prison law library is inadequate is preserved for appeal.

D.

Equitable Tolling Applies To The Statute Of Limitations In Mr. Hill's PostConviction Proceeding, Because Mr. Hill's Right Of Access To The Courts
Was Denied
Mr. Hill submits that equitable tolling applies to his post-conviction petition,

because he was denied his right of access to the courts. The State argues that Mr. Hill
has not shown that the district court erred when it determined that Mr. Hill did not
"establish sufficient tolling" to avoid dismissal of his post-conviction petition as untimely.
(Resp. Br., p.16.) In support of this contention, the State argues that Mr. Hill has not
shown that the prison law library or legal assistance program were inadequate, or that
he suffered any actual injury as a result of the alleged shortcomings. (Resp. Br., pp.1723.)

Contrary to the State's arguments, Mr. Hill's right of access to the courts was

denied because the State failed to furnish an adequate law library or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law, and Mr. Hill suffered an actual injury as a
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result of those deficiencies. Thus, equitable tolling applies to Mr. Hill's post-conviction
petition, and the district court erred when it dismissed with prejudice the petition.

1.

The State Failed To Furnish An Adequate Law Library Or Adequate
Assistance From Persons Trained In The Law

Mr. Hill asserts that the State failed to furnish an adequate law library or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. The right of access to the courts
requires the State to confer the "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts," through providing inmates
with either "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law." Lewis, 518 U.S. 343; Bounds, 430 U.S. 817.
Mr. Hill asserts that the State failed to furnish an adequate law library because it
did not provide inmates with access to case law. The State argues that "case reporters"
are not constitutionally required for a prison law library to be adequate. (Resp.
Br., pp.17-18.)

However, the lack of access to case law precludes the State from

conferring the guaranteed "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences
or conditions of confinement before the courts." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356.
As Mr. Hill has previously discussed (App. Br., pp.18-19), the lack of access to
case law precludes the State from conferring the guaranteed "capability of filing suit,"
see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356, because the lack of access to case law prevents inmates

from knowing and understanding vital legal concepts such as the time requirements or
limitations periods for filing claims they wish to pursue. (See Tr., p.55, Ls.10-17.) Some
time requirements or limitations periods are found in case law, not in statutes. (See
Tr., p.55, Ls.10-17.) The case law containing those time requirements and limitations is
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therefore among the "tools [Bounds] requires to be provided," because inmates need
the case law "in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Because
inmates cannot know or understand some of the time requirements and limitations
involved in attacking their sentences or challenging the conditions of their confinement
without access to case law, the prison law library's lack of access to case law means
that it does not confer the guaranteed "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356.
Thus, the State did not furnish an adequate law library.
Further, Mr. Hill asserts that the State did not furnish adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law because the prison "paralegals" are prohibited to give legal
advice. The State argues that Mr. Hill has not cited "any authority that actually supports
his assertion that the [C]onstituton requires prisons to have individuals available who
can give legal advice." (Resp. Br., p.18.) Bounds and its progeny, which demonstrate
that the right of access to the courts contemplates that "adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law" requires the provision of legal advice, refute the
State's argument.
As examined in Mr. Hill's Appellant's Brief (App. Br., p.20), the United States
Supreme Court in Bounds discussed, as an alternative to adequate law libraries,
programs providing "some degree of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance
to prisoners" as a method to assure meaningful access to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S.
at 830-31. Some of the "many imaginative forms" of these programs involved inmate
paralegal assistants, paraprofessionals, law students, and lawyers-persons all capable
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of providing legal advice. See id. at 831. Further, the Court expressly contemplated the
provision of legal advice through the use of "[i]ndependent legal advisors" who could
"mediate or resolve administratively many prisoner complaints that would otherwise
burden the courts" and "convince inmates that other grievances against the prison or
the legal system are ill-founded .... " Id. at 831.

Later in Bounds, the Court used

"trained legal advisors" to describe "adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law." Id. at 833 (emphasis added); see Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 97 (2d
Cir. 2004).
While the Bounds Court stated that "a legal access program need not include any
particular element we have discussed," Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832, it also explained that
"[a]ny plan . . . must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with
constitutional standards."

Id.

Although the legal assistance programs discussed in

Bounds included a wide variety of elements, the programs all incorporated some sort of
provision of legal advice in order to comply with constitutional standards.
Despite the State's arguments, Lewis renewed the emphasis on a constitutionally
adequate legal assistance program's provision of legal advice. As recognized by the
State (Resp. Br., p.19), the Lewis Court noted with approval, as an alternative to law
libraries, a legal assistance program involving "some minimal access to legal advice and
a system of court-provided forms." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added). Thus,
the Court's approval of a legal assistance program involving some minimal access to
legal advice is inconsistent with the State's contention that "[t]he access afforded to
[Mr.] Hill was more than adequate to satisfy his constitutional right to access" (Resp.
Br., p.19), because Mr. Hill did not have any access to legal advice.
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Cases from other jurisdictions also indicate that a legal assistance program, to be
constitutionally adequate, must somehow include the provision of legal advice to
inmates.

See, e.g., Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 93 (confirming "that the appointment of

counsel can be a valid means of satisfying a prisoner's right of access to the courts");
Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299, 1302 (4 th Cir. 1987) (observing that, "Once the state
foreclosed the remedy of law libraries, the remaining choice was obvious.

The

alternative to a system of libraries was some form of assistance to prisoners from
trained attorneys"); Williams v. Wyrick, 747 F.2d 1231, 1232 (8 th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(concluding that an inmate did not show a denial of access to the courts, where twentythree inmates on death row had been assigned two inmate paralegals and one runner
to procure law books, copy portions of legal materials, and research legal questions for
the inmates); Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4 th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
system making "lawyers regularly available to prisoners for consultation and advice ...
adequately insures that prisoners will have their claims reviewed and presented to the
courts"); see also Koerschner v. Warden, 508 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853, 860-61 (D. Nev.
2007) (observing that "where ... there is no functionally significant law library access,
something more in the nature of 'active assistance' by persons with some actual
meaningful training in the law may be required," and expressing skepticism as to
whether the "active assistance" by minimally-qualified inmate law library assistants, who
were able to field litigation questions from inmates and complete legal research, was
from persons trained in the law); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 536 (Ct. App. 1997)
("Without either access to Idaho legal reference books, with which to research their
rights and prepare their own pleadings, or the availability of representation by persons

11

trained in Idaho law and procedure, prisoners would find the Art. I,§ 18 guarantee that
'courts of justice shall be open to every person,' a hollow promise.").
While most of the above legal assistance programs did not go so far as to
"effectively demand permanent provision of counsel," which is not required by the
Constitution, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, they all included the provision of some level of
legal advice by persons trained in the law. The programs did not feature any particular
common element, but providing some form of "trained legal advisors" is necessary to
meet the constitutional standards for an adequate legal assistance program.

See

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832-33.

Like an adequate law library, an adequate legal assistance program-through
the provision of at least "some minimal access to legal advice"-confers the guaranteed
"capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of
confinement before the courts." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356.

Because the prison

paralegals here were prohibited from providing any legal advice, the legal assistance
program did not confer the guaranteed "capability of filing suit." See id. Thus, the State
failed to furnish adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
The guarantee acknowledged in Bounds and Lewis is disjunctive: the "capability
of filing suit" may be provided either through furnishing "adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356;
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828; see also Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1003 (6th Cir. 1992)

("It is noteworthy that Bounds refers to law libraries or other forms of legal assistance, in
the disjunctive, no fewer than five times."

(internal quotation marks omitted));

Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F .2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Bounds does not create an entitlement
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to legal aid assistance if library access is otherwise constitutionally adequate."). Thus,
the State's arguments that requiring the provision of legal advice for legal assistance
programs to be adequate would invalidate law libraries as an alternative (Resp.
Br., pp.19-20), have already been rejected by the courts. If a prison were to confer "the

capability of bringing contemplated

challenges to sentences or conditions of

confinement before the courts" through furnishing adequate law libraries, it would not
need to additionally furnish legal advice as part of an adequate legal assistance
program.

See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356; Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.

However,

because of the myriad deficiencies here, the State furnished neither an adequate law
library nor adequate legal assistance from persons trained in the law.

2.

Mr. Hill Suffered An Actual Injury, Because His Post-Conviction Petition
Was Dismissed With Prejudice As A Result Of The State's Failure To
Furnish An Adequate Law Library Or Legal Assistance Program

Mr. Hill asserts that he suffered an actual injury because his case was dismissed

with prejudice as a result of the deficiencies in the prison law library and legal
assistance program. The State argues that Mr. Hill has not shown that he suffered any
actual injury as a result of the shortcomings in the prison's access to courts programs.
(Resp. Br., pp.19-23.)

However, Lewis indicates that Mr. Hill has shown that he

suffered an actual injury.
In Lewis, the United States Supreme Court explained that an inmate may suffer
an actual injury where "a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy
some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal
assistance facilities, he could not have known." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Indeed, the
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Lewis Court later found that a prisoner whose lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice
suffered an actual injury. Id. at 356-57.
Like the inmate's lawsuit in Lewis, Mr. Hill's post-conviction petition here was
dismissed with prejudice. (R., pp.275, 277.) Because of the deficiencies in the prison
law library and legal assistance program, Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to
file a post-conviction petition in order to raise the legal challenges he wished to make.

(See Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.4.) Because Mr. Hill did not know to file a post-conviction
petition, he did not know the time constraints set by the relevant statute of limitations.
Because Mr. Hill did not know about the statute of limitations, his case was dismissed
with prejudice. Thus, Mr. Hill suffered an actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
Although the State suggests that Mr. Hill did not suffer an actual injury because
this case somehow falls outside the guarantee of the right of access to the courts (see
Resp. Br., p.20), that suggestion is unsupported. Mr. Hill does not seek to transform
himself into a "litigating engine[]capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative
actions to slip-and-fall claims."

See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355.

Rather, in this post-

conviction action, Mr. Hill seeks "[t]he tools [Bounds] requires to be provided ... those
that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in
order to challenge the conditions of their confinement."

See id.

His post-conviction

petition falls squarely within the matters covered by the "capability of filing suit"
guaranteed by the Constitution. See id.
Further, while the Court in Lewis disclaimed those statements from Bounds that
"appear to suggest that the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and
to litigate effectively once in court," Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at
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825-26 & n.14) (emphasis in original), Mr. Hill does not assert that the State was
required to enable him to discover a grievance.

Mr. Hill already knew that he had a

grievance against his trial counsel before he knew to file a post-conviction petition to
pursue that grievance, as shown by his statement that "the only reason I know about a
post conviction is I was talking to a gentleman about how my lawyer, my lawyer got me."

(See Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.38, L.2.) Mr. Hill only submits that the deficiencies in the law
library and legal assistance program "hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim" based
on the grievance. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
The State's argument that Mr. Hill did not suffer an actual injury, because the
relevant "information was made available to [Mr. Hill] regardless of whether it was
constitutionally compelled" through the post-conviction packet (see Resp. Br., p.21), is
also unavailing.

While the post-conviction packet mentions "[p]etitioner received the

ineffective assistance of counsel" and "[p]etitioner's plea was not knowingly or
voluntarily entered" as two of the possible grounds for post-conviction relief (R., p.112),
it does not follow that this information precluded Mr. Hill from suffering an actual injury.
Although the State contends that mere "[a]ssistance on how to access the
courts . . . is the right protected by the Constitution" (Resp. Br., p.19 (emphasis in
original)), "meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone" of "the right vindicated by

Bounds." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Thus, in Lewis the Court held that two inmates with language problems suffered actual
injuries, despite the prison's claim that it was not responsible for any lack of access to
the courts experienced by the two inmates because it had met its constitutional
obligations through providing "physical access to excellent libraries, plus help from legal
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assistants and law clerks." Id. at 356-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because
the Constitution "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of ...
the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of
confinement before the courts," id. at 356, the existence of the libraries and legal
assistance program did not preclude the two inmates in Lewis from suffering actual
injuries. Their actionable claims of that nature had been rejected or prevented because
the guaranteed "capability of filing suit" had not been provided to them. See id. at 356.
Similarly, even with the existence of the post-conviction packet here, Mr. Hill
suffered an actual injury. His post-conviction petition was dismissed with prejudice as a
result of the deficiencies in the prison law library and legal assistance program, i.e.,
because the guaranteed capability of filing suit had not been provided to him. See id.
at 356.

Because of the deficiencies in the prison law library and legal assistance

program, Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to file a post-conviction petition, or
even request a post-conviction packet, in order to raise the legal challenges he wished
to make.

Although Mr. Hill was given the List of Litigation Self-help Packets

(hereinafter, the List), and the List states that the post-conviction packet is available to
inmates, the List does not explain that a post-conviction petition may be used to raise
the ineffective assistance of counsel or knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea
arguments that Mr. Hill had in mind. (See R., p.255.)
Case law, not the text of I.C. § 19-4901 itself, explains that such arguments may
be raised in post-conviction. See I.C. § 19-4901; Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 274
(1990). However, the prison law library did not provide inmates with any access to case
law. Further, because the prison paralegals were prohibited to provide any legal advice,
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they would not have been able to explain to Mr. Hill that those arguments may be raised
in a post-conviction petition. (See Exs., p.1 (a prison paralegal, responding to Mr. Hill's
statement that "I also need to know what I need to research to find out what a post
conviction is," wrote, "Paralegal cannot give legal advice").) 1 Thus, Mr. Hill had no way
to know that he needed to file a post-conviction petition, or even request a postconviction packet, to pursue the claims he wanted to make.
While there was testimony that the Idaho Code volumes available to inmates are
annotated with case cites "where that's applicable" (see Tr., p.84, Ls.17-21), there is no
evidence on this record to support the State's argument (see Resp. Br., p.22), that the
version of I.C. § 19-4901 available to inmates is annotated with sections entitled
"Grounds for Relief" and "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel." Additionally, even if the
version of Section 19-4901 available to inmates were annotated as the State contends,
Mr. Hill would not have been able to find the post-conviction statute or any annotations
based on the information provided in the List. The List states, "Post conviction relief is
available only on specific grounds as outlined in Idaho Code § 4901 [sic]." (R., p.255.)
Because the List uses an incomplete citation for the post-conviction statute, Mr. Hill was
unable to know which volume of the Idaho Code to consult to find any annotations or
otherwise learn whether the legal challenges he wished to raise were among the
grounds for post-conviction relief. (See R., p.255.) Inmates are required to request the
books they want to check out by title. (Tr., p.57, Ls.16-20, p.85, Ls.6-9.) Because the
List does not state that the post-conviction statute is part of Title 19 of the Idaho Code,
Mr. Hill could not have known the proper title to request so he could read the statute

This citation refers to the 172-page electronic document "Supreme Court No. 405702012 Exhibits.pdf."
1
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and learn the grounds for post-conviction relief. Thus, Mr. Hill would have been unable
to consult Title 19 of the Idaho Code or Section 19-4901, even if he had attempted to
request them from the paralegals. (See Tr., p.57, Ls.16-20.)
The deficiencies in the prison's law library and legal assistance program left
Mr. Hill with no way of knowing that he had to file a post-conviction petition in order to
raise the legal challenges he wished to make. Because Mr. Hill did not know to file a
post-conviction petition, he did not know the time constraints set by the relevant statute
of limitations, and his case was dismissed with prejudice. Put otherwise, he has shown
that he suffered an actual injury because his post-conviction conviction "was dismissed
for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the
prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at
351. Mr. Hill has "demonstrate[d] that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. at 351.
In sum, the State did not confer the guaranteed capability of filing suit, because it
failed to furnish an adequate law library or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law.

Mr. Hill suffered an actual injury from those deficiencies because his post-

conviction petition was dismissed with prejudice as a result of the State's failure to
furnish adequate law libraries or adequate legal assistance.

Thus, Mr. Hill has

demonstrated that his right of meaningful access to the courts was denied. See Lewis,
518 U.S. 343; Bounds, 430 U.S. 817.
Because Mr. Hill, for purposes of the Bounds standard, has demonstrated that
his right of access to the courts was denied, he has also demonstrated that equitable
tolling applies to the statute of limitations in his post-conviction proceeding.
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See

Ochieng, 147 Idaho at 626, Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535-36. Thus, the district court erred

when it dismissed with prejudice Mr. Hill's petition for post-conviction relief, because
Mr. Hill was denied his right of access to the courts and equitable tolling
therefore applies.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hill
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's memorandum opinion and
judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition for post-conviction relief, and remand the
case for further proceedings on the merits of Mr. Hill's petition.
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2014.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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